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O
ne of the risks of making a bank loan or
investing in a debt security is credit risk,
the risk of borrower default. In response
to this potential problem, new financial instru-
ments called credit derivatives have been devel-
oped in the past few years. Credit derivatives can
help banks, financial companies, and investors
manage the credit risk of their investments by
insuring against adverse movements in the credit
quality of the borrower. If a borrower defaults,
the investor will suffer losses on the investment,
but the losses can be offset by gains from the credit
derivative. Thus, if used properly, credit deriva-
tives can reduce an investors overall credit risk.
Estimates from industry sources suggest the
credit derivatives market has grown from virtu-
ally nothing two years ago to about $20 billion
of transactions in 1995. This growth has been
driven by the ability of credit derivatives to
provide valuable new methods for managing
credit risk. As with other customized derivative
products, however, credit derivatives expose their
users to risks and regulatory uncertainty. Con-
trolling these risks is likely to be an important
factor in the future development of the credit
derivatives market.
This article provides information on the ration-
ale and use of credit derivatives. The first section
of the article describes how to measure credit risk,
whom it affects, and the traditional strategies
used to manage it. The second section shows how
credit derivatives can help manage credit risk.
The third section examines the risks and regula-
tory issues associated with credit derivatives.
CREDIT RISK
Credit risk is important to banks, bond issuers,
and bond investors. If a firm defaults, neither
banks nor investors will receive their promised
payments. While there are a variety of methods for
managing credit risk, these methods are typically
insufficient to reduce credit risk to desired levels.
This section defines credit risk, describes how it can
be measured, and shows how it affects bond
issuers, bond investors, and banks. The section
also describes the techniques most commonly used
to manage credit risk, such as loan underwriting
standards, diversification, and asset securitization.
Robert S. Neal is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City. Douglas S. Rolph, a research associate at the bank,
helped prepare the article.What is credit risk?
Credit risk is the probability that a borrower
will default on a commitment to repay debt or
bank loans. Default occurs when the borrower
cannot fulfill key financial obligations, such as
making interest payments to bondholders or
repaying bank loans. In the event of default,
lendersbondholders or bankssuffer a loss be-
cause they will not receive all the payments
promised to them.
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Credit risk is influenced by both business cycles
and firm-specific events. Credit risk typically
declines during economic expansions because
strong earnings keep overall default rates low.
Credit risk increases during economic contrac-
tions because earnings deteriorate, making it
more difficult to repay loans or make bond
payments. Firm-specific credit risk is unrelated to
business cycles. This risk arises from events spe-
cific to a firms business activities or its industry,
events such as product liability lawsuits. For
example, when the health hazards of asbestos
became known, liability lawsuits forced Johns-
Manville, a leading asbestos producer, into bank-
ruptcy and to default on its bonds.
A broad measure of a firms credit risk is its credit
rating.  This measure is useful for categorizing
companies according to their credit risk. Rating
firms, such as Moodys Investors Services, assign
a credit rating to a company based on an analysis
of the companys financial statements. Credit
ratings range from Aaa for firms of the highest
credit quality, to Ccc for firms likely to default.
2
A more quantitative measure of credit risk is
the credit risk premium. The credit risk premium
is the difference between the interest rate a firm
pays when it borrows and the interest rate on a
default-free security, such as a U.S. Treasury bond.
The premium is the extra compensation the bond
market or commercial bank requires for lending
to a company that might default. As a firms
credit risk increases, bond investors and com-
mercial banks demand a higher credit risk pre-
mium. This increase is necessary to offset the
higher expected losses on the bond or loan due
to the increased probability that the loan will not
be repaid.
The characteristics of credit risk premiums are
displayed in Chart 1. The chart shows the risk
premiums for Aaa and Baa industrial bonds from
1984 to 1994. The top line is the interest rate for
all Baa-rated bonds less the interest rate for
10-year Treasury bonds, while the bottom line
shows the rate for Aaa bonds less the 10-year
Treasury rate. There is a strong relation between
the credit rating and the credit risk premiumthe
higher the credit rating, the lower the credit risk
premium. As a result, a downgrade in a com-
panys credit rating can significantly increase its
borrowing costs. The chart also shows that the
cost of borrowing for a company with a constant
rating can vary over time. For example, the Baa
premium increased from 1.4 percent in August
1981 to 3.0 percent in November 1981.
Who is affected by credit risk?
Credit risk affects any party making or receiv-
ing a loan or a debt payment. Some examples
include bond issuers, bond investors, and com-
mercial banks.
Bond issuers. Bond issuers are affected by credit
risk because their cost of borrowing depends
crucially on their risk of default. A borrower who
plans to issue debt in the near future faces the
risk that unanticipated events will suddenly in-
crease the costs of borrowing. For example, the
recent disclosure of a $1.1 billion trading loss at
Daiwa Bank raised fears of the banks default,
which  increased its cost of borrowing.
3 Moreover,
even without a change in a companys firm-specific
credit risk, a downturn in the economy could
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the cost of borrowing for all bond issuers.
Bond investors. Investors in individual bonds
are exposed to the risk of a decline in the bonds
credit rating. A downgrade in a credit rating will
increase the bonds credit risk premium and
reduce the value of the bond. Similarly, mutual
funds that hold a portfolio of corporate bonds
will be affected by fluctuations in the average
credit risk premium. Increases in the premium
will reduce the value of the funds holdings and
hurt the funds total return.
Commercial banks. Banks are exposed to the risk
that borrowers will default on their loans. The
credit risk faced by banks is relatively high for
two reasons. First, banks tend to concentrate their
loans geographically or in particular industries,
which limits their ability to diversify credit risks
across borrowers. Second, credit risk is the pre-
dominate risk in loans made to businesses. Most
business loans have adjustable rates, with the
interest rate periodically reset to reflect changes
in the default-free rate. Since these loans incorpo-
rate changes in the default-free rate, movements
in the default-free rate pose little risk to banks.
The credit risk premium, however, is fixed when
the loan is made. If the premium subsequently
rises, lenders will suffer because the loan pay-
ments are insufficient to compensate for the
higher risk.
Baa
Note: The Baa credit risk premium is the average rate on Baa corporate bonds less the 10-year Treasury bond rate. The Aaa
credit risk premium is the average rate on Aaa corporate bonds less the 10-year Treasury bond rate.
Source: Moodys Investors Service and Board of Governors.
CREDIT RISK PREMIUM FOR BONDS
Chart 1
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A variety of methods are available to manage
credit risk. Traditional methods have focused on
loan underwriting standards and diversification.
Over the last ten years, an alternative approach
to managing credit risk has focused on selling
assets with credit risk. Banks can sell their loans
directly or they can securitize, or pool together
their assets with credit risk and sell parts of the
pool to outside investors. Either way reduces
credit risk because the credit exposure is trans-
ferred to the new owner. Unfortunately, these
methods are insufficient for managing the credit
exposure of many financial firms. 
Underwriting standards and diversification. The
traditional approach to managing credit risk is
based on the application of underwriting stand-
ards and diversification. For example, take a bank
loan officer who is deciding whether to make a
loan. After a careful review of the prospective
borrowers financial statements, the officer
would consider such factors as earnings, profit
margins, and the amount of outstanding debt
and bank loans. If the prospects for the loan look
good, the loan officer then considers the condi-
tion of the borrowers industry by examining
competitive pressures, product cycles, and future
growth prospects. Upon a favorable review, the
bank loan officer would manage the credit risk
exposure by controlling the terms of the loan.
The officer would set limits on the size of the
loan, establish a repayment schedule, and require
additional collateral for higher risk loans. A
mutual fund that invests in corporate bonds goes
through a similar credit analysis, although it
cannot set the terms of the borrowing.
The next step in the traditional approach is to
diversify the credit risks across different borrow-
ers. The diversification principle relies on offset-
ting risks. For example, consider the  earnings of
two park vendors, one who sells ice cream and
another who sells umbrellas. On sunny days, the
ice cream vendor does well, while the umbrella
vendor does poorly. On rainy days, the umbrella
vendor does well, while the ice cream vendor does
poorly. Although the individual earnings of the
two vendors can be quite volatile, the combined
earnings are much less volatile due to the negative
relation between their earnings.
4 The same prin-
ciple holds for a portfolio of bank loans. The
factors that cause industrial companies to default
on their loans will differ from the factors that
cause farmers to default on their loans. Relative
to holding either type of loan separately, combin-
ing both types of loans into a portfolio allows
the bank to reduce the volatility of its earnings.
5
The  earnings from some loans will offset the
losses  from defaulted loans, thereby reducing the
likelihood that, on net, the bank will lose money.
While diversification and underwriting stand-
ards are necessary first steps for managing credit
risk, their ability to reduce credit risk is often
limited by a scarcity of diversification opportu-
nities. For example, because small commercial
banks typically confine their lending to their
local area, the lack of geographic diversification
means the earnings from their loans will depend
heavily on the condition of the local economy.
Similarly, the finance divisions of automobile
companies face limited diversification opportu-
nities. While a finance division can diversify
some credit risk by lending to different dealers,
cyclical movements in the economy will affect all
dealers, thereby limiting the opportunities for
diversification.
Securitization and loan sales. In recent years, the
development of markets for securitized assets and
for loan sales has provided another method for
managing credit risk. In the asset securitization
approach, bonds or loans with credit risk are
pooled together and sold to an outside investor.
For example, the finance division of an automo-
tive company can combine many of its loans into
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other financial institutions. From an investors
perspective, purchasing part of the package is
attractive because the diversification across many
loans reduces the overall credit risk. In addition,
to the extent that returns from the package are
not closely correlated with the investors other
holdings, diversification allows the investor to
reduce the credit risk of his overall portfolio.
From the automobile companys perspective, sell-
ing the loans eliminates the companys credit
exposure to the loans. The substantial growth in
the market for non-housing-related securitized
assets is one indication of the success of this
approach for managing credit risk. In 1994, $75
billion of such securitized assets were issued, up
from virtually nothing in 1984. 
Banks can use the market for loan sales to
manage their credit risk in a similar manner.
After making a loan to a company, a bank can sell
the loan to other banks or to institutional inves-
tors. One common example of a loan sale occurs
when a bank provides short-term financing for a
corporate takeover. After making the loan, the
bank will quickly sell the loan to other investors.
This strategy is attractive to banks because they
earn a fee from the loan origination but the credit
risk is assumed by the new investor. Occasionally,
banks will lend large amounts in a single take-
over, so that controlling the credit risk is ex-
tremely important. The use of loan sales by banks
to manage their credit risk has increased rapidly in
the last few years. In 1994, banks sold $665 billion
of loans, up from about $200 billion in 1991.
 The markets for securitized assets and loan
sales provide valuable tools for managing credit
risk. Unfortunately, the securitization approach
is only well suited for loans that have stand-
ardized  payment schedules and similar credit risk
characteristics, such as home mortgages and auto-
mobile loans. Loans for commercial and indus-
trial purposes, in contrast, have diverse credit
risks. Consequently, it is difficult for banks to
securitize these loans or sell them to institutional
investors. In cases such as these, a more promis-
ing way to manage the credit risk is through
credit derivatives.
MANAGING RISK WITH CREDIT
DERIVATIVES
Credit derivatives are financial contracts that
provide insurance against credit-related losses.
These contracts give investors, debt issuers, and
banks new techniques for managing credit risk
that complement the loan sales and asset securi-
tization methods. This section examines three
types of popular credit derivativescredit swaps,
credit options, and credit-linked notesand
shows how they can help manage credit risk.
6
Credit swaps
Credit swaps reduce credit risk through diver-
sification. Credit swaps are appealing to commer-
cial banks whose loan portfolios are concentrated
in particular industries or geographic areas. In-
stead of diversifying credit risk by lending out-
side its local area or by selling some loans and
purchasing others, a bank can swap the payments
from some of its loans for payments from a
different institution.
The simplest type of credit swap is called a loan
portfolio swap. Take, for example, two hypotheti-
cal banks, Kansas Agricultural Bank, which lends
mostly to farmers, and Chicago Industrial Bank,
which lends mostly to manufacturers. The swap
transaction between the two banks also involves
an intermediary, St. Louis Risk Management. To
execute the transaction, Kansas Agricultural Bank
sends the loan payments it receives from, say, $50
million of its agricultural loans to St. Louis Risk
Management (Figure 1). Simultaneously, St.
Louis Risk Management receives $50 million of
loan payments from Chicago Industrial Bank. St.
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payments between the two banks. Since there is
little common movement in default rates between
farmers and manufacturers, both banks are better
off. The swap allows each bank to diversify away
some of its credit risk, and St. Louis Risk Man-
agement receives a small fee for arranging the
transaction.
The most common credit swap is called a total
return swap. In this type of transaction, Kansas
Agricultural Bank sends its loan payments to St.
Louis Risk Management, which, in turn, sends
the payments to Minneapolis Mutual, a hypo-
thetical insurance company (Figure 2). In exchange
for the loan payments, Minneapolis Mutual
sends an adjustable-rate interest payment to St.
Louis Risk Management, which sends the pay-
ment to Kansas Agricultural Bank. Based on a
$50 million investment, Minneapolis Mutual
might send Kansas Agricultural Bank a return of
2 percent greater than the 3-month Treasury bill
rate. The effect of this swap for Kansas Agricultural
Bank is to trade the return from its loan portfolio
for a guaranteed return that is 2 percent above
the short-term default-free rate. Because the
return is guaranteed, Kansas Agricultural Bank
has eliminated the credit risk on $50 million of
its loan portfolio.
7
Relative to loan sales, total return swaps offer
two important advantages. First, they allow banks
to diversify credit risk while maintaining confi-
dentiality of their clients financial records. In a
total return swap transaction, the borrowing
firms records remain with the originating bank.
When loans are sold, the firms records are trans-
ferred to the new owner of the loan. Second, the
administrative costs of the swap transaction can
be lower than for a loan sale transaction. For
example, an institution such as an insurance
company may be ill suited to monitor loans and
to ensure that floating rate loans are properly
adjusted for changes in the default-free rate. Thus,
reducing administrative expenses allows diversi-
fication to be achieved at a lower cost.
LOAN PORTFOLIO SWAP
Figure 1
Payments from Chicago Industrial
Banks $50 million loan portfolio
St. Louis Risk
Management
Payments from Kansas Agricultural
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Credit options are a second type of credit
derivative used to hedge the risk of adverse changes
in credit quality. A simple way to understand
credit options is to use an analogy with car
insurance. All car owners pay a fee to purchase
car insurance and protect themselves from finan-
cial loss. If the car is undamaged, the car owner
receives nothing from the insurance company. If
the car is wrecked, the insurance company pays
the owner enough to replace the car. Thus, for a
fee, the insurance policy hedges the value of the car
by eliminating the risk of a large financial loss.
Credit options provide a similar hedging func-
tion. These options allow investors to buy insur-
ance to protect themselves against adverse moves
in the credit quality of financial assets. For exam-
ple, a bond investor might buy an insurance
policy to hedge the value of a corporate bond. If
the bond defaults, the payoff from the insurance
policy would offset the loss from the bond. If
there is no default, the investor would continue
to receive the interest payments from the bond
but receive nothing from the policy. 
The key features of credit options are identical
to options on stocks. For example, consider a call
option on IBM stock. The owner of the call
option has the right to buy IBM shares at a
previously determined price called a strike price.
When the current price of IBM exceeds the strike
price, the owner of the call option can earn a profit
by purchasing shares of IBM at the strike price
and then selling them at the current market price.
A second type of option is a put option. In
general, put options are similar to insurance
policies because they protect investors from
declines in the value of the underlying asset. An
IBM put option, for example, gives the owner of
the option the right to sell IBM shares at a
predetermined strike price. If the market price
falls below the strike price, the owner of the
option can earn a profit by purchasing IBM
TOTAL RETURN SWAP
Figure 2
Payment equals Treasury bill rate +
2 percent on a $50 million investment
St. Louis Risk
Management
Payments from Kansas Agricultural
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the strike price. A put option, therefore, provides
insurance against a decline in IBMs stock price.
While these examples link the payoff of the
option to the price of the underlying stock,
options are also available where the payoff is
linked to an interest rate. For example, fixed-rate
mortgages typically provide a 30-day interest rate
lock. Following approval of the loan, the prospec-
tive homeowners mortgage rate is protected
against rate increases for 30 days. This interest
rate protection is actually a call option on the
interest rate because the homeowner implicitly
receives a payment if mortgage rates rise follow-
ing the loan approval. For example, if the rate
increases by 0.5 percentage point, the homeowner
implicitly pays the increase, but also receives an
offsetting payoff from the call option. Thus, the
interest rate lock offsets any increases in mort-
gage rates, ensuring that the homeowners rate
will not rise.
In a similar manner, bond issuers can use credit
options to hedge against a rise in the average
credit risk premium. As a hypothetical example,
suppose Midwest Telephone, a Baa-rated com-
pany, is planning to issue $100 million of 1-year
bonds in two months. The bonds are to be paid
back in one year, and the interest rate Midwest
Telephone anticipates paying is 1.5 percentage
points above the 1-year Treasury bill rate. If there
is an increase in the average credit risk pre-
mium for Baa companies before the debt is
issued, Midwests interest payments will also rise.
To hedge against this possibility, Midwest could
purchase a call option on the credit risk pre-
mium.
8 Just as a call option protects a home-
buyer against a rise in mortgage rates, the call
option on the credit risk premium protects Mid-
west against increases in the premium. If the
premium rises above the strike rate specified in
the option, Midwests higher interest payments
will be offset by gains from the option.
To illustrate this example, say Midwest Tele-
phone buys a call option on the average Baa
credit risk premium. For the $100 million bond,
the price of the option is $500,000. The current
credit risk premium is 1.5 percent and the call
option will pay Midwest if the premium exceeds
1.5 percent in two months. Because the strike rate
equals the current risk premium, the option
protects Midwest against an increase in the
premium. If a downturn in overall economic
conditions causes the average premium to rise to
2.5 percent, the one-percentage-point rise in the
credit risk premium will cause Midwests inter-
est payments to increase by $1 million. The
higher interest payments, however, will be offset
by the payoff from the option (1 percent times
$100 million, or $1 million). Since the payment
from the call option offsets the increased
borrowing costs, purchasing the call option
allows Midwest to hedge against increases in the
premium.
9
Alternatively, suppose that the credit risk pre-
mium falls to 0.5 percent. In this case, the call
option has no payoff, but Midwest saves $1
million (1 percent of $100 million) because it can
borrow at the lower rate. Thus, purchasing the
call option allows Midwest to insure against
increases in the credit risk premium while main-
taining the benefits of lower borrowing costs if
the premium declines. In either case, Midwest
would still pay the $500,000 for the option, just
as it would pay a premium for any other insur-
ance policy.
Credit options can also be used by bond inves-
tors to hedge against a decline in the price of a
bond. Such a decline might be caused by a
downgrade in a companys debt. To hedge this
risk, the investor can purchase an option that has
a large payoff if the credit quality of the bond
declines. A decline in quality will trigger a loss
on the bondholdings, but this will be offset by
the gains from the option. This insurance protects
22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYthe investor from adverse movements in a firms
credit quality.
10
To illustrate, suppose an investor owns $10
million of a companys bonds. To insure against
an adverse movement in the companys credit
quality, the investor might buy a put option on
the bonds with a $9 million strike price for
$40,000. This option would give the investor the
right to sell his bond holdings for $9 million
anytime during the next year. Purchasing the
option ensures that the investor will get at least
$9 million for the bonds.  If the market value of
the bonds falls to $7 million in one year, the
payoff of the option will be $2 million. Alterna-
tively, if the value of the bonds rises to $12
million in a year, the value of the put option will
fall to zero. Thus, the put option protects the
investor against price declines while still allowing
the investor to benefit from price increases.
One particularly common form of credit
option is called, somewhat inappropriately, a
credit default swap. This swap is actually a put
option on a portfolio of bonds or loans. The
owner of the default swap receives a payoff if
more than a prespecified number of the bonds
default. For example, suppose an investors port-
folio includes 20 Baa bonds, each of which
promises to pay $1,000 in one year. The investor
might purchase a credit default swap for $20 that
promises to make a payment if three or more of
the 20 bonds default. For each bond that defaults,
the investor receives the difference between the
$1,000 promised payment and the yearend price
of the defaulted bond.
11
The appeal of a credit default swap is that it
limits the investors credit risk. It is designed for
investors who are willing to absorb small credit
losses but want protection against large losses. In
exchange for a relatively small fee, the investor is
exposed to the risk that one or two bonds may
default but is protected against additional losses.
While investors clearly have an incentive to
purchase credit options, it is natural to ask who
would agree to sell such options. Industry sources
suggest that insurance companies are among the
principal sellers. Insurance companies specialize
in assessing health and property risks and in
charging an appropriate fee for insurance. Insur-
ing financial risks is a logical extension of their
business. They earn a fee for selling the credit
options and can diversify their risks by selling
credit options in different industries and in
different areas.
Credit-linked notes
A credit-linked note is another type of credit
derivative that can be used by debt issuers to
hedge against credit risk. A credit-linked note is
a combination of a regular bond and a credit
option. Just as with a regular bond, the credit-
linked note promises to make periodic interest
payments and a large lump sum payment when
the bond matures. The credit option on the note,
however, typically allows the issuer to reduce the
notes payments if a key financial variable speci-
fied by the note deteriorates.
 For example, a credit card company may use
debt to fund a portfolio of credit card loans. To
reduce the credit risk, the companys debt issue
could take the form of a 1-year credit-linked note.
This note promises to pay investors $1,000 and
an 8 percent coupon if a national index of credit
delinquency rates is below 5 percent. If the index
exceeds 5 percent, however, the coupon falls to 4
percent.  The credit card company thus has a
credit optionthe company has the right to lower
the interest payments if the overall credit quality
of cardholders deteriorates.
A credit card company would issue a credit-
linked note because it provides a convenient
mechanism to reduce the companys credit expo-
sure. If cardholder defaults are low, then the
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default rates are high, the companys earnings are
reduced, but it only has to pay a 4 percent
coupon. By structuring the note in this way, the
credit card company is purchasing credit insur-
ance from the investors.
Investors would consider buying such a credit-
linked note because they earn a higher rate of
return than the credit card companys regular
bonds. When the company issues the notes, the
price of the notes will be lower than the price of
the companys regular bonds. The lower price
compensates investors for the risk that their
interest payments could decline. For a given
interest payment, the reduced price that investors
pay gives them a higher return.
CREDIT DERIVATIVES: RISKS AND
REGULATORY ISSUES
While credit derivatives provide a valuable tool
for managing credit risk, they can also expose the
user to new financial risks and regulatory costs.
Like other over-the-counter derivative securities,
credit derivatives are privately negotiated finan-
cial contracts. These contracts expose the user to
operational risk, counterparty risk, liquidity risk,
and legal risk. In addition, there is uncertainty
regarding the regulatory status of credit deriva-
tives and the appropriate capital charges for bank
loans hedged with credit derivatives. For the most
part, these risks are either controllable or rela-
tively small and therefore unlikely to restrict the
development of the credit derivatives market.
What are the risks of credit derivatives?
Perhaps the largest risk of using credit deriva-
tives is operational risk. Operational risk is the
risk that traders could imprudently use any de-
rivative instrument for speculation instead of
hedging. For example, losses from unwarranted
derivatives-related trading caused the dissolution
of Barings PLC, a British investment bank, and
contributed to the default of Orange County,
California. While operational risk can be large,
it can also be controlled easily. Rigorous internal
control  procedures, for example, can prevent
traders from establishing inappropriate positions.
A second source of risk is counterparty risk.
This is the risk that the counterparty to a transac-
tion will default. For example, in the total return
swap described earlier, Minneapolis Mutual could
default after initiating the swap with Kansas
Agricultural. Because of this possibility, credit
derivatives cannot completely eliminate credit
risk.
While counterparty risk is a source of concern,
the magnitude of this risk is relatively small. For
a firm to suffer a loss from a counterparty
default, all the following must occur: the coun-
terparty must default, the counterparty must owe
money on the credit derivative transaction, and
the loss must be greater than can be absorbed by
the intermediary to the transaction. The likeli-
hood that the intermediary cannot absorb the
loss, however, is very low. The intermediaries are
either top-rated commercial banks or the Aaa-
rated subsidiaries of investment banks. Both
types of organizations are well capitalized and
carefully hedge the risk of their transactions
(Figlewski).
A third source of risk is liquidity risk. Liquidity
risk is the uncertainty about being able to sell or
offset a previously established position. For firms
holding credit derivatives strictly for hedging,
liquidity risk is relatively unimportant. For exam-
ple, consider a bond issuer who uses a credit
option to hedge its future costs of borrowing.
Because the option will be structured to expire
on the borrowing date, the bond issuer will
simply hold the option until expiration. In con-
trast, liquidity risk is an important consideration
for issuers of credit derivatives and for users of
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position before the contract matures. Liquidity
risk is currently high because there is no active
secondary market for participants to hedge their
credit exposure or to offset a previously estab-
lished position. To the extent that the market
becomes more active, this risk will decline.
A fourth source of risk for credit derivative
users is legal risk. Legal risk is the possibility that
a derivative contract may be deemed illegal or
unsuitable. The Orange County bankruptcy pro-
vides an example of legal risk. For several years,
the County successfully invested in risky, fixed-
income derivative securities. A sudden and large
change in interest rates, however, caused a steep
decline in the value of its securities, leaving the
County unable to meet margin calls. In the wake
of the bankruptcy, the County sued the invest-
ment bank that sold them the securities. The
County claimed it was illegal for it to hold such
securities and therefore the derivative securities
were unenforceable contracts. The issue is cur-
rently being resolved in the courts. If the courts
agree with the County, the likelihood will in-
crease that losing parties on other derivative
transactions will adopt legal defenses to avoid
honoring their derivative contracts. Such a devel-
opment would strongly restrict growth in the
credit derivatives market.
Regulatory issues
Another uncertainty confronting users of
credit derivatives is their regulatory status. Should
credit derivatives be treated as securities, com-
modities, swaps, or insurance products? This
distinction is important because these contracts
are regulated by different agencies and under
different terms. Swaps, for example, are regulated
by the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion. Suppose that a firm enters a credit swap
contract. If the regulatory status changes and the
contract is subsequently regarded as a security, it
would then be under the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Since
SEC regulations require additional disclosure,
the contract could be considered illegal. A change
in regulatory status could therefore potentially
invalidate previously established credit deriva-
tive transactions.
Another regulatory issue is capital require-
ments for credit derivatives. Banks may find that
hedging credit risk actually increases their capital
requirements. Suppose a bank uses a credit
derivative to construct a long-term hedge for the
credit risk of a large borrower. The credit deriva-
tive reduces the risk of the bank, but under
current risk-based capital standards there is no
recognition of the lower risk. Not only is there
no reduction in the banks capital requirement
for the loan, but the bank must set aside
additional capital to insure against counterparty
default. As credit derivatives become more avail-
able, regulators will need to assess the circum-
stances under which credit derivatives can reduce
a banks capital requirements. If regulators allow
prudently structured credit hedges to reduce capi-
tal charges, banks will have a strong incentive to
adopt such hedges, which would reduce their
credit risk and allow them to make more loans.
CONCLUSION
Credit risk is an important consideration for
banks, bond issuers, and bond investors. The
conventional methods of managing credit risk,
such as diversification, bank loan sales, and asset
securitization, offer only a partial solution to
controlling credit risk exposure. In recent years,
the growing market for credit derivatives has
provided powerful new tools for managing credit
risk that are less costly and more effective than
traditional methods. Lenders such as commercial
banks and investors such as mutual funds can use
credit derivatives to hedge against adverse moves
in the credit quality of their investments.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1996 25Despite its recent growth, the market for credit
derivatives is still in its infancy. Many observers
believe that the growth in credit derivatives will
parallel the enormously successful interest rate
swap market. For this to occur, however, credit
derivative issuers and users must resolve uncer-
tainties associated with regulatory status, legal
status, and the adequacy of internal control pro-
cedures.
ENDNOTES
1 An alternative definition of credit risk relies, not on
absolute default rates, but on the variability of actual default
rates relative to expected default rates. Suppose a lender
expects a 20 percent default rate on a portfolio of high-risk
loans and sets the interest rate accordingly. If the subsequent
default rate is close to 20 percent, it can be argued that the
credit risk of the portfolio is actually low. The lender has
earned a high rate of return on the loans and the uncertainty
surrounding the rate is low. To keep the presentation simple,
the article uses the definition in the text.  Use of the
alternative definition does not change any of the results in
the article.
2 From highest to lowest quality, Moodys ratings are Aaa,
Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and Ccc.  Categories Baa and above are
termed investment-grade bonds, while categories Ba and
lower are termed non-investment-grade, or junk, bonds.
3 Two weeks after the disclosure of the trading loss, Standard
and Poors downgraded Daiwas bonds. The bond market
reaction to the disclosure was even swifter. The price of
Daiwas bonds fell immediately, suggesting that investors
required a higher credit risk premium to compensate for the
additional default risk.
4 Diversification can also reduce volatility even if the
earnings of the firms are positively related. All that is
required for diversification to yield benefits is that the
earnings of the two firms not be perfectly positively correlated.
5 Strictly speaking, the gains from diversification are
primarily obtained from reducing firm-specific credit risk.
Diversification will yield fewer benefits in reducing credit
risk associated with business cycles because these
fluctuations affect all firms.
6 Whittaker and Kumar provide a more detailed discussion
on the uses of credit derivatives.
7 Strictly speaking, the credit risk has not been eliminated
because of the possibility that the counterparty, Minneapolis
Mutual, may default. Since the counterparties typically have
high credit ratings, however, credit risk is significantly
reduced.
8 Longstaff and Schwartz provide a mathematical model for
pricing such options.
9 In this example, the strike price of the option was set to
1.5 percent, the same as the level of the Baa credit risk
premium when the option was purchased. In practice, an
issuer could purchase an option with a higher strike price.
The advantage of a higher strike price is that the price of the
option is lower. The disadvantage is that it offers less
protection against an increase in the average credit risk
premium.
10 For a discussion of the methods used to price such options,
see the articles by Das and by Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull.
11 The credit default swap is called a swap because of its
payment structure. Instead of directly paying the
intermediary $20 for the option, the bondholder swaps a
payment to the intermediary in exchange for the default
protection. The payment is expressed as a fraction of the
value of the total promised payments of the bond portfolio.
In this case, the payments would be $20/$20,000, or 0.1
percent. The bondholder would swap 0.1 percent of the
promised payments to the intermediary in exchange for the
default protection.
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